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Toen ik 18 was en net van het gymnasium kwam stond ik met mijn vader voor een redelijk aftands 
gebouw vlak bij Station Hoog Catherijne in Utrecht. We waren daar voor een voorlichtingsdag van de 
Hogeschool voor een bachelor opleiding in communicatie. Ik was eerder zelf al wezen kijken bij de 
Universiteit van Amsterdam, maar wist toen niet zeker of communicatie wetenschappen wel echt een 
studie voor mij was. Het leek nogal abstract en voornamelijk gebaseerd op theorie en kritiek met 
betrekking tot communicatie en media op maatschappelijk niveau. Iets minder abstract en ook met een 
oog naar de praktijk leek me echter wel wat. Ik hoopte dus ook op een goedkeurend woord van mijn 
vader. In tegenstelling mompelde hij wat, en vroeg ik nog een keer wat hij zei voordat we naar binnen 
liepen. Gebakken lucht, herhaalde hij, communicatie is toch allemaal gebakken lucht. Het druiste tegen 
zijn eigen idee in van een tastbaar beroep en vakmanschap, en was meer iets van de nieuwe generatie. Een 
hoop drukdoenerij zonder dat het wat oplevert. Die opmerking ging eigenlijk nu pas weer bij het 
voorbereiden van deze rede door mijn hoofd, dus ik heb er in die tijd niet echt lang bij stilgestaan. Maar 
het schetst ook wel een goede inleiding voor waar ik het over wil hebben; namelijk dat communicatie in 
en rond organisaties soms meer of minder symbolisch of zelfs volledig fictief kan zijn, maar wel degelijk 
een effect heeft, op bijvoorbeeld het ontwerp van organisaties of het succesvol opzetten van nieuwe 
ondernemingen. Al dit kan eigenlijk niet zonder een gezonde dosis van gebakken lucht. 
  
Everyone has a theory of organizing and organizations. Everyone is in some way connected to 
organizations in modern day society, and that means that we all have theories about what organizations 
are and what makes them tick. A tacit theory of corporate organizations - that corporations are 
accountable to shareholders – is for example embedded in the very fabric of capitalism. Many people 
have challenged this particular theory by questioning the limited liability of managers in corporate 
organizations and by trying to broaden the focus of corporations towards the benefit of other stakeholders 
such as employees and members of local communities. We absorb still other ideas from our intellectual 
climate to change our views of organizations: ideas that we obtain from the expertise of authorities and 
the conventional wisdom of the day. 
Our own individual theory of organization is the wellspring of much in our lives. Working in 
organizations we consult it when we want to persuade or inform others or when we need to decide on a 
particular course of action. Studying organizations, it advises us on how work is performed, what 
responsibilities organizations have and what we can expect of them, and how we can best control our own 
behaviour when we deal with organizations. And because it delineates what falls within the remit and 
control of organizations, it affects our values: what we believe we can reasonably expect from 
organizations as stakeholders or members of society. Rival theories of organization exist and are based on 
very different images of what organizations are and how they accomplish their goals.  
A theory of organizations, as of any other subject, involves a system of ideas and principles that 
explains what an organization is and how it operates. A theory is not simply about observations or facts. It 
is not just about the physical buildings, materials, products and people associated with a particular 
organization, but it is about the construal of those observations or facts: how the intricate and complex 
swirl of activities, resources, people and events that we understand as an organization can be 
conceptualized and understood by human minds. A feature of theories that I have repeatedly encountered 
through my research is that organizations are typically understood in terms of concrete images, or frames, 
that connect ideas and principles and often in terms of concrete scenarios across space and time (e.g., 
Cornelissen, 2005; Cornelissen & Durand, 2012).  
Consider for example how human minds conceptualize organizations and theorize about them. A 
classic but still widespread theory of organizations is based upon an image of organization as if they are 
machines which are efficiently designed to produce certain outputs and meet pre-defined targets. This 
particular image goes back to Frederick Winslow Taylor‟s formulation of industrial bureaucracy in the 
early 1900s, better known as scientific management, which involved a mixture of ideas and principles 
from mechanical engineering and “social physics” (Guillen, 1997). The assumption underlying this image 
was that productivity could be enhanced by specifying cause and effect in the production process, similar 
 to the controlled mechanics of a machine. Hence, managers are charged with designing and planning 
work similar to how an engineer designs a machine, leaving the workers with the task of implementation. 
Workers in turn can be characterized in purely physical terms as cogs in a machine or as units of energy 
(Taylor measured workers in “foot-pounds of energy”) and on that basis can be selected for their 
mechanical fit with a particular pre-specified task.  
This particular image laid the foundation for many of the technical approaches to understanding and 
managing organizations (e.g., control systems, cost savings, “human resources” management) that are still 
with us today. One of the most recent examples involves the “reengineering” movement that swept across 
North America and much of Europe in the 1990s. Throughout the 1980s, many large firms had grown 
through a strategy of acquiring firms and diversifying into new industries. This resulted in large and 
unwieldy enterprises that proved to be financially unsustainable and it was therefore suggested that these 
organizations needed to be “reengineered” around a more limited and core set of businesses and activities 
(Davis et al., 1994). The objective of “reengineering” was to “downsize” these large conglomerate firms 
by divesting unrelated businesses and by “restructuring” the organization around a much more focused set 
of activities in a related set of markets or industries. Staying true to the image of an organization as a 
machine, organizations had to be redesigned around one or a few production processes and with an 
efficient use of human “resources” in mind. Promoted by leading management consultancies such as 
McKinsey, Bain and the Boston Consulting Group, the implementation of these reengineering principles 
led to “leaner” and more efficient organizations but also caused unprecedented levels of redundancies and 
worker unrest in the 1990s.   
Perhaps not surprisingly, this particular theory of organizations and the machine image that underlies 
it has been much criticized. It can indeed be upsetting to think of workers as glorified gears and springs. 
Machines are insensate, built to be used, and disposable; whereas human workers are sentient and possess 
dignity and rights. A machine has some workaday purpose such as grinding grain and is fully 
mechanized. We typically think of human workers as having higher purposes such as gaining enjoyment 
and fulfilment from work. Workers also have human-like abilities such as creativity, volition and 
entrepreneurship which are not accounted for in the standardized and fully controlled routines of a 
machine.  
An image that has been proposed as an alternative to the machine is to conceptualize an organization 
as communities or networks of individuals that are tied through social connections instead of through 
hierarchical relationships. Another rival image that has been cast is to think of organizations as patterns of 
inter-locking actions that have become routine and institutionalized over time. Through repeated usage, 
actions come to be understood and treated as natural which ensures that employees will perform them in 
roughly the same way at each point in time. The alternative image, then, is to think of actions as being 
performed or enacted in line with conventionalized or institutionalized expectations and understandings 
instead of thinking of them as being mindlessly executed as technical operations in a machine.  
  
The fact that rival construals of the same phenomenon (organizations) are possible tells us that the nature 
of reality does not dictate the way that reality is represented in people‟s minds and articulated to one 
another. The language of thought allows us to frame the same phenomenon in different, at times 
incompatible ways. An organization can be framed and thought of as a machine, network or social 
structure depending on how we mentally imagine it for ourselves, which in turn depends on what we 
choose to focus on and what we choose to ignore (Cornelissen, 2005). The way in which we frame an 
organization in alternative ways leads to alternative decisions and courses of action with direct 
consequences for ourselves as well as for the economy and society at large. 
Alternative frames also reveal different ideological positions on how organizations can best 
accomplish their ends and on how workers and employees, based on their abilities and motivations, 
should be controlled. Often, alternative ways of framing an organization are pitted against each other, and 
the disputants struggle to show that their framing is more apt. Since the 1990s, for example, intellectuals 
and academics have argued for replacing stale mechanistic images of organizations and of the economy at 
large with the metaphor of distributed intelligence, anticipating the move towards network organizations 
and developments such as open innovation and crowd sourcing. The pitting of different images against 
each other highlights another curious fact about framing and the language of thought. In puzzling about 
how to account for the organizations of today, we draw upon ideas and vocabularies from different 
domains in society and mobilize the ideas of our time. The factory image that was mentioned emerged out 
of the industrial revolution, a time in which engineers like assisted organizations with the standardization 
and mechanization of production processes. Nowadays, we have network images of distributed 
intelligence drawn from ideas in computer science and the cognitive and brain sciences.  
At this point, one may wonder why it matters that people in general produce these images as rival 
accounts or fully-fledged theories of organizations. One may feel that it is a matter of mere “semantics”, 
with its implication of splitting hairs and debates associated with the ivory tower of academics and 
universities. But I hope to show in the following half an hour that how people understand the world of 
organizations, and hence semantics, is not only a matter of intellectual fascination but also of real-word 
importance. Though “importance” is often hard to quantify, an early example may put a value on it. What 
exactly is an organization and why does it matter? Corporations, as one type of organization, are granted 
legal rights as if they were individual “persons”, a legal status that allows managers of those corporations 
to operate with limited personal liability. This legal certification of corporations means that by law 
managers have to focus on delivering profits and returns for the corporation‟s shareholders (Cornelissen, 
2011). That also means that these corporations are formally required to put the interests of their 
shareholders ahead of those of their other stakeholders such as their employees or members of the local 
 communities in which they operate. It also implies that on occasion corporations have been found to 
“externalize” costs such as the dumping of their toxic waste in order to enhance profits, a feat that is 
possible because of the limited personal liability of managers (Bakan, 2004). Corporations, as already 
mentioned, grew in the 1980s by a conscious strategy of “portfolio planning”, a process by which 
corporations acquired other companies and made investments in a range of markets and industries based 
on the idea of a corporation as an investment vehicle. Just as an individual may hold shares in different 
enterprises, the idea was that a corporation could similarly be seen as a bundle of investments set out 
against the growth potential and odds of different markets. However, when by the early 1990s portfolio 
planning did not lead to the promised returns and made corporations grow unmanageably large, 
consultants stepped in with yet another definition of the corporation based on the image of an 
organization as a machine. Corporations had to be “reengineered” around core production processes with 
everything else divested or outsourced. Business units of corporations changed hands and many 
employees lost their jobs as a result of this downsizing trend. The 1990s also saw yet another image of 
corporations take hold: that of corporations as responsible “corporate citizens”. The extreme focus on the 
bottom-line and shareholder concerns came under pressure from governments and publics across the 
globe who felt that corporations needed to start acting as ethically minded citizens who try to curb their 
impact on the environment and look after the well-being of all their stakeholders and not just their 
shareholders. Many corporations have since followed suit and have developed elaborate corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) initiatives to demonstrate their social and environmental credentials. What this quick 
tour through definitions and images of the corporation shows is that there is nothing “mere” about 
semantics: the words and thoughts that we use to describe organizations have real-world consequences for 
shareholders, stakeholders, managers and employees as well as financial markets, and the economy and 
society at large.  
 
  
Semantics is about how we use words such as “reengineering” or “corporate citizen” to conceptualize 
organizations and to think about them. It is about the relation of language to reality – the way in which 
managers, employees, consultants, politicians and everyone else commit to a shared understanding of 
what organizations are, and the way their thoughts are anchored to developments and situations in the 
world. It is also about the relation of words to a community – how words when they are introduced come 
to evoke the same idea in an entire community, so that people can understand one another when they use 
it. Words and the language that we use to define organizations evoke images of what we believe 
organizations are or should be. In turn, the language that academics, managers and consultants use is an 
important medium by which they express their thoughts about organizations. The use of words and 
language, in other words, allows us a window into their ideas about organizations. An important point 
here, as I have already tried to suggest, is that virtually all images about organizations are produced by 
using words metaphorically, and not literally. Strictly speaking, a metaphor is a “figure of speech in 
which a word or phrase is applied to something to which it is not literally applicable” (Oxford English 
Dictionary). Our words disclose conceptions of organizations as if they are machines, social structures, 
computers, or corporate citizens (Cornelissen, 2005). Organizations are of course not literally machines or 
citizens (at least not in how we originally understand these concepts). However, by transferring these 
words from their original domain to the sphere of organizations we are able to extend our thinking. 
Mobilizing words from other domains enables us to frame organizations in novel and multiple ways. It 
opens up possibilities for seeing and understanding organizations, to fix our perspective that would 
otherwise not be there if we would only restrict ourselves to a set of literal words. In other words, 
metaphors give us alternative ways of framing organizations, a feat of language and thought that explains 
how and why there is such wide variety and change in our thinking about organizations.  
In this sense, then, using language fluidly and metaphorically is useful as a way of thinking about 
abstract and complex subjects such as organizations. Doing so brings complexity into the confines of a 
single image by drawing upon parallels between organizations and other, concrete domains of knowledge. 
Thus, when we liken an organization to a machine, we use our knowledge of machines to form an image 
of what an organization is like. The metaphor frames our understanding of the organization in a 
distinctive but partial way. Metaphors tend to produce partial insights because a particular image 
highlights certain interpretations at the expense of others. The image of an organization as a machine 
brings aspects of efficiency and engineering into focus but ignores the human aspects. The metaphor is 
thus at the same time enlightening and biased or limiting. Metaphors, as associative forms of reasoning, 
also aid our decision-making as tools of inference that can be carried over from a conventional to novel 
domain, where they can do real work (Bateson, 1972). Put differently, they can power sophisticated 
 inferences. When people in organization enact such inferences it may have predictable consequences that 
may be self-reinforcing. To demonstrate this very point, I briefly refer to a recent study with Eero Vaara 
and Saku Mantere; where we analysed the real-time communication processes between Metropolitan 
Police Officers that led to the unfortunate shooting of Jean Charles de Menezes in London in 2005. The 
shooting happened as part of an anti-terrorist operation set up to chase four terrorists who were still at 
large in the city on the 22
nd
 of July after a failed bombing attempt. Because the bombers were still at large 
it was decided that a specialist firearms team would be on stand-by 24 hours a day to assist in the 
manhunt for these suspects. A designated senior officer (DSO), Cressida Dick, was appointed to lead the 
manhunt as she had been one of the first senior officers to receive training for “Kratos” situations. Kratos 
was, and still is, the code-word for policies and tactics that were developed for dealing with suspected 
terrorist suicide bombers. Operations under Kratos allow for pre-emptive police strikes before terrorist 
crimes and casualties can occur. Accordingly, police officers are able to fire a critical head shot to 
incapacitate or kill a suspected terrorist (rather than the standard practice of firing at the torso) when 
authorised by a senior commander and without needing to provide a verbal challenge as this would alert 
the suspect to the presence of the police.  
The operation and the potential use of the Kratos protocol presented an unprecedented situation for 
Commander Dick as well as for the other surveillance and firearms officers on the ground. A critical 
characteristic of the operation was that it involved stressful, fast-changing circumstances. An alleged 
suspect could also not be approached, unless it was confirmed that he was the target, which in turn would 
mean that he would be preemptively shot. Any alternative actions could alert the suspect to the presence 
of the police, risking the detonation of a bomb. These particular conditions not only put enormous 
pressures on police officers to get the identification right, but arguably also necessitated a degree of 
flexibility in framing and real-time communication processes to allow for improvisation in context and to 
match a highly volatile environment that carried the potential for error (Weick et al. 1999). 
At around 9:33 on the morning of the 22
nd
 of July 2005, Jean Charles de Menezes left the communal 
entrance at Scotia Road, the address that Police had identified for one of the suspects. He was first seen 
by Frank of the red surveillance team, who was in a van parked nearby and communicated over a closed 
circuit radio to his team members that he was “worth a second look”. Two other officers, James and Ken, 
drove past him in a car, and both only saw a partial glimpse of his face. Whilst sitting in the car James 
took the opportunity to look at the photograph of the target for the operation and concluded that he was 
“possibly identical with” the suspect and was in effect “a good possible likeness”. He recorded this in his 
log and at 9:41, James contacted the Scotland Yard control room. Although Jean Charles de Menezes was 
not directly identified as the suspect, this expression suggests a large degree of overlap (“identical with”) 
between the two profiles, with this intersection possibly warranting a positive identification. A few 
moments later, the control room asked James to “tell them a percentage of identification”, in other words, 
put a percentage on how sure they were that the man they were following was the suspect. James, 
 however, responded that he thought it was a ridiculous question; he felt that identification was either fully 
positive or negative (“he is or he isn‟t” as he put it), but he nonetheless asked his team over the radio. 
Because no one replied he took it that none could assist in a positive identification. Pat then asked James 
if he could say anything at all to help answer the question and to assist them in their decision-making. 
Pressed for an answer, James replied “for what it‟s worth, I think it‟s him”. Upon hearing the reply, Pat 
communicated to Dick and her command team “It is him, the man off [the] bus. They think it is him and 
he is very, very jumpy”. Besides recording the identification as fully positive, Pat‟s expression suggests 
that the suspect was apparently rather nervous, out of control, and probably on the verge of reaching his 
target for the detonation of a bomb.  
On the basis of this framing of the movements of Jean Charles de Menezes, Commander Dick 
decided to mobilize the firearms team, who in the end shoot Jean Charles de Menezes, despite the fact 
that he was never directly identified and was fully innocent. What does this brief episode show about 
language and framing in the context of organizations? First of all, it shows that when words are used in 
context they do not strictly determine meaning; instead, words prompt larger conceptual frames, such as 
that of chasing a suicide bomber, which in turn means that in ongoing speech individuals need to detect 
the changing background assumptions, or frames, necessary for continued interpretation (Goffman, 1974). 
The use of words, as acts of framing, are in turn often defined with respect to a background conceptual 
frame and performs a categorization that provides perspective and also takes the frame for granted 
(Fillmore, 1982). An important characteristic of frames is thus that words invoke or cue larger frames, 
such as that of a terrorist bomber, that impart organizing structure. Activating a frame organizes 
experience and creates expectations about important aspects of the context or circumstance by directing 
individuals to elaborate on the prototypical scenario in a manner suggested by the frame. Individuals like 
the firearms officers in this case use such frames to make inferences in context, to make default 
assumptions about unmentioned aspects of situations, and to make predictions about the consequences of 
their actions. When the firearms officers came face-to-face with Jean Charles de Menezes in Stockwell 
tube station, all they could see for example was a bulky jacket (supposedly concealing an explosive) and 
they also interpreted his action of standing up as a direct challenge, as if he were a terrorist bomber. 
While frames are resources for sensemaking, they may also entrap people and impede their ability to be 
mindful in real-time sensemaking contexts. Despite their advantages for meaning construction, the 
primary problem with frame-based systems of understanding is that they may be overly brittle (Weick 
1995).  
Frames, in other words, may turn out to be rigid data structures that cannot accommodate events that 
are out of the ordinary. Indeed, the blind commitment to a frame within organizations is an important 
source of failure in the context of dynamic or unprecedented circumstances that require inferential 
flexibility and improvised behaviors. The ability of individuals to transcend any particular frame thus 
appears to be crucial for individual and collective intelligence and mindfulness in context. In the case of 
 the shooting, there is an example of this in Ivor, a surveillance officer, who is virtually the only one in the 
entire operation who doubts as to whether JCM was the suspect. He saw him at the tube station collect a 
copy of the Metro newspaper, get a ticket from his pocket and go towards the entrance barriers to the 
station. Having seen this, Ivor then asked over the central radio; “Do you want him lifted?” Ivor was 
aware that firearms officers were mobilized and that his own role, as part of the strategy, was restricted to 
surveillance. The metaphorical expression he used highlights his position close to JCM and his ability to 
pick him up, that is, to take him out of the immediate surroundings of the underground (which were 
reminiscent of the attacks of the day before) and to bring an end to the pursuit. He thus shifted between 
the initial frame of the ongoing chase or pursuit (that Ivor would be able to “lift” him out of) with an 
alternative framing of a normal police operation that allowed Ivor, as a surveillance officer, to approach 
and detain JCM contrary to the strategy that was set for the operation. Furthermore, in the train carriage 
below ground, Ivor later shifted again from following standard protocol by pointing out JCM, but he then 
took the unprecedented step of bear hugging the suspect and pushed him back into his seat. As a 
surveillance officer he should have cleared the way for an armed intervention. Instead, he physically 
detained the suspect, as an alternative to an armed intervention, in an attempt to defuse the situation and 
possibly to allow more time for a positive identification. What Ivor demonstrates in this highly 
pressurised context is the very root of leadership and innovation in being able to doubt the present state of 
affairs and in envisioning an alternative frame. This may have played out in a dramatic fashion in this 
context, but despite the peculiarities of the case has much broader import. 
  
Frames thus mediate how people in organizations make sense of their actions, experiences and of their 
larger organizations. This is an important insight and in turn suggests that organizations themselves, as 
entities, consist of institutionalized frames that are routinely enacted. Within organizations, such 
institutionalized frames around being a surveillance officer or a firearms officer for example are defined 
as underlying meaning structures that organize social experience across a general strip of activity 
(Goffman, 1974). As naturalized and taken-for-granted structures of cultural meaning they order and 
stabilize interaction patterns, routines and practices within an organization and embody „structures of 
expectation‟ that prime individuals to elaborate on the roles and behavioral scripts associated with a 
particular frame. These institutional frames describe classes of actors, types of situations and 
characteristic and routinized actions. They also mark contiguous links between the elements of a frame, 
such as the template of a „role‟ (i.e., an actor-in-situation) and that of a „script‟ (i.e., actions in particular 
situations). Through the institutionalized role template, for example, we can see a situation as composed 
of sets of actors carrying out systematic and coordinated activity through the enacting of social roles. The 
template provides a structured understanding and also prompts, as part of the larger frame, an associated 
set of legitimate scripts for a given activity (Goffman, 1974). When these scripts are in turn enacted, 
within the context of a work group or organization, it enables individuals to comprehend and predict the 
behavior of others through stereotypical inference and, as such, supports coordinated collective action if 
individuals commit themselves to playing out the scripted situations (Christensen & Cornelissen, 2011).  
The institutionalized nature of frames within organizations thus describes the enduring and sticky 
nature of scripts and routines and the professional role identities of actors such as surveillance officers 
and firearms officers. Actors have been socialized into these role identities and scripts as part of their 
training and induction. When they enact these scripts, as part of their routines, they will also largely do 
that in an automatic manner. The key point here is that, academically speaking, this explains how the 
making of meaning exhibits regularity, and with that, it also provides a sense of how many organizations 
consist of institutionalized practices, routines, rules and regulations that are the direct embodiment of 
background institutional frames. These frames may be updated and stretched a little in response to 
feedback of what works and what does not (Rerup & Feldman, 2010). However, with such stretching and 
updating the core of the initial frame, and any routines that flow from that, generally remains intact. 
Within the Kratos operation, a firearms officer was still just that: a trained professional charged with an 
armed intervention, whilst the script for the operation now also allowed for a pre-emptive strike without a 
verbal warning.  
What this step-by-step updating of frames, and associated routines and practices, explains less well is 
processes of change, entrepreneurship and innovation, where the default frames are being challenged or 
 even explicitly sidestepped, as in the case of Ivor‟s attempt to save the life of Jean Charles de Menezes. In 
the words of Turner (2001: 145) classic approaches to framing and cognition have proved “nearly useless 
for explaining how a new schema can arise before it is manifest in our regular experience”. What is thus 
needed is a fuller account of how new frames, and with that new realities, are conceptualized, come into 
being, and may themselves in future times become institutionalized. To answer this question I turn to my 
work with Jean Clarke on entrepreneurs and what makes them successful innovators. Entrepreneurs, 
whether they are self-employed or work for a larger organizations, provide a good case for looking at 
questions of change and novelty because they are often not bound in their thinking by the restrictions of 
given frames. Successful entrepreneurs are able to instigate and conventionalize new products and 
markets, potentially creating jobs and economic growth in the process.  
The core of our work involved looking at video-taped interactions and presentations of successful 
and less successful, and serial and novice entrepreneurs. What was directly evident was that entrepreneurs 
seemed to vary significantly in how they framed the innovations that they had been working on and how 
they were able to communicate this to stakeholders to get their buy-in and support. Some clearly engaged 
in counter-factual reasoning to mark the difference from established practices and products in their 
targeted industries. Others drew on analogical parallels with established practices elsewhere in other 
industries to claim currency for their ideas and to gain legitimacy and support from investors. In turn, this 
led us to formulate a theory of entrepreneurship (Cornelissen & Clarke, 2010; Clarke & Cornelissen, 
2011) where we conceptualize the creation of new ventures as a process by which entrepreneurs come to 
imagine the opportunity for novel ventures, refine their ideas, and, after an initial investment, justify their 
ventures to relevant others to gain much-needed support and legitimacy. The guiding question for our 
research was how do entrepreneurs come to create and justify new ventures in such a way that they 
acquire institutional legitimacy and the necessary resources for venture growth? Given that initially at 
least entrepreneurs only have visions or beguiling fictions, with no track record or performance often yet 
achieved for their ventures, this seemed an apt way of capturing a core aspect of entrepreneurship. Past 
research has also not fully addressed this question, with most accounts theoretically or empirically 
equating the process with antecedent cognitive scripts or psychological traits of entrepreneurs or focusing 
on structural or performance outcomes and the achievement of legitimacy in an industry. Equating 
entrepreneurship with such antecedents or outcomes overemphasizes either the individual and his or her 
present cognitive state or the configuration of the social context and institutional outcomes, at the expense 
of what we argue is needed in the form of a more integrative understanding of the process of how 
entrepreneurs come up with new ideas, and, through communicating with others, find support for them. 
Specifically, we argued quite radically that ideas do not suddenly pop fully formed into an entrepreneur‟s 
head, but emerge from processes of communication with others, whether those others are initially close 
friends and family or even later on business contacts and investors. We also argued that, whilst 
communicating, entrepreneurs create new frames that are connected towards business opportunities for 
 their ventures and that often follow from analogical or metaphorical forms of speaking and thinking 
where ideas from other domains are transplanted to the venture and industry in question.   
A good and high-profile example of this process is the late Steve Jobs, who has always talked about 
how dropping out of college had served him well as it had allowed him to follow courses that he found 
intrinsically interesting. He followed courses on Buddhism and calligraphy for example. The insights and 
experiences from these courses, he later claimed, informed his thinking about the design of the Mac 
computer. The importance of calm, for example, featured in his efforts to design computers without a 
noisy fan, and the deep insights that he got from the calligraphy course informed how he wanted the 
Apple user interface to be designed. He thus metaphorically fused insights from other cultural domains of 
experience into the development of technology, a feat that he repeated later on with the Ipod, Iphone and 
Ipad. In doing so he conceptually blended ideas from other fields with technology, in effect creating a 
whole new set of industries in the process and moving into territories such as music where previously 
Apple had not had a presence. He thus clearly broke with the institutionalized distinctions between the 
computing, media and music industries.  
  
So far, we have seen that whilst frames are resources for sensemaking, they may also entrap individuals 
and impede their ability to be mindful in real-time sensemaking contexts, as was the case for the majority 
of police officers involved in the shooting of Jean Charles de Menezes. In fact, whilst frames have some 
adaptability in context, their inferential capacity is based on knowledge represented in the frame itself, 
and frames are therefore by their very nature limiting. I have also argued that frames fundamentally 
mediate understanding and form the bedrock of institutions in the form of common routines or practices. 
Taking this one step further, a key question, as I have tried to argue, is to understand the ability of 
individuals, whether they are leaders, entrepreneurs or front-line staff, to transcend any particular frame 
which is crucial for individual and collective intelligence, learning, innovation and entrepreneurship. In 
this lecture, drawing on some of my past research, I have hinted at the role of analogies and metaphors in 
breaking away from existing frames and envisioning alternative realities. This ability to doubt or question 
the current status quo and to see alternatives (Bateson, 1972; Goodman, 1978) is not just a semantic 
quibble, as it is tied into matters of life and death in the case of Jean Charles de Menezes, as well as the 
creation of new products and markets for many entrepreneurs. I have highlighted processes of frame-
shifting around the case of Ivor, which basically involves individuals querying the initial frame that exists 
or has been built up and mobilizing an alternative frame from background knowledge to structure 
expectations and to make inferences. I have also briefly mentioned processes of frame blending, which as 
in the case of Steve Jobs, involves the combination of multiple frames, rather than shifting from one to 
another (Turner, 2001). The result is a hybrid or a fusion of elements from different frames, with the 
advantage of such blends being that it often leads to emerging inferences and insights – for example, in 
terms of radically new markets and industries.  
In terms of future plans, there is obviously much ground to cover. The basic theoretical mechanisms 
around framing and instances of reframing through frame shifting and frame blending are taking shape, 
and can form the centre of more detailed studies in the context of organizations, institutions and 
entrepreneurship. Much of this work will hopefully extend the research already done with colleagues in 
different empirical contexts. I hope to continue the work on framing and coordination in action within 
both conventional organizational settings as well as so-called high reliability organizations. Similarly, the 
work on entrepreneurship offers real opportunities to extend the initial research through continuing to 
work with colleagues at Leeds and VU University. I hope in particular to refine our understanding of how 
material resources and circumstances may interact with the conceptual processes of framing on the part of 
entrepreneurs, an interest shared by colleagues in cognitive linguistics and communication studies at VU 
University. Together with colleagues in my own department of Management and Organization, a direct 
aim will be to elaborate and refine the theoretical framework sketched by Jean Clarke and I and to blend it 
 with alternative psychological and sociological lenses so as to potentially improve its explanatory power. 
One promising avenue here will be to connect the framework with research on networks, which is firmly 
established at VU University including work on entrepreneurship (Stam & Elfring, 2008). Besides its 
riches, network analysis typically presents changing social configurations with observed variance in 
clusters and ties, but it does not as such present direct explanations on how individual entrepreneurs forge, 
manipulate or exploit their social networks. Combining methods with a focus on framing and 
communication may bring benefits, in terms of understanding the formative processes in the configuration 
and establishment of network ties as well as in reaping the benefits of such ties. In short, we are starting to 
see the beginnings of a new theory, or set of theoretical mechanisms, to understand organizations, 
institutions and entrepreneurship. In this lecture, I have casually walked through different contexts and 
domains, but throughout a core interest remains: understanding how, in and through communication, 
people within and around organizations create individual and joint understanding about organizations, in 
terms of what they are, how they function, and what to make of specific events such as strategic changes 
or innovations associated with those organizations (Cooren et al., 2011). This, I believe, is a fundamental 
set of questions, that if we get closer to answering them will have a profound and significant impact on 
organizations, as the dominant institutions of our time. My purpose today has been to demonstrate the 
importance of this project and the potential impact on practice.   
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